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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondent has either willingly misconceived or
willfully misportrayed the proceedings in the trial
court; and a reply seems warranted.
Notwithstanding the court granted a summary
judgment with respect to construction of, the partnership articles, respondents' counsel insists upon discussing the case as if there had been a trial of fact issues.
3
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He refers at length to estoppel, good faith, reliance
and fair dealing, none of which were presented to or
passed upon by the trial court.
On page 6 of respondents' brief the following statement is found: "Rulon's counsel made no objections to
any pleadings, admissions, affidavits, exhibits or any
objections of any kind;" but beginning on page 96 of
the record, (the hearing in which Judge Ellett granted
the summary judgment) the following is reported:
"MR. SCHOENHALS: May we introduce
that instrument into evidence and have it received into the evidence, the actual instrument
itself that was delivered to Terry West, and
have it marked and received 1
"THE COURT: Is it admitted that the signature of Terry West and Rulon R. West appears on the document?
"MR. ROE: It is, but I have some defenses
to this document your Honor and-well, I will
move to reconsider.
"THE COURT:
have1

What defenses will you

"MR. ROE: Well, I have this defense for one
thing, that this was-this is supposed to be a
supplement to this agreement of-this purports
to be agreement for consideration. This purports
to be supplement to that agreement of dissolution. The partnership articles themselves provide
that in anything other than ordinary day to day
things that affect the business of the partnership,
it has to be signed by all three parties unanimously.
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"MR. SCHOENHALS: May we have that
letter also received into the evidence, your
Honor?
"THE COURT: The agreement"MR. ROE: I am objecting to all of the evidence introduced here.

*

*

*

*

"MR. ROE: I want to state for the record,
because I think that this record may have to go
up, Judge"THE COURT: Yes, I would expect you to
take it up.
"MR. ROE: -and I would like to state my
position for the record that we have contended
all along that the addtiional amounts that were
paid by Rulon R. West to Terry R. West were
not and never intended to be contributions to
capital, that they were loans to the partnership,
and that the evidence in the case of a trial of this
thing would so show.
"THE COURT: Well, maybe I had better
take the bench and let you put your evidence on.
Do you have a motion before me?

*

*

*

*

"MR. ROE: If the record does not support
my motion for summary judgment and it appears that there are triable issues of fact, then
the court should not grant my motion, and they
should set it up for trial of those triable issues.
"THE COURT: I think with what he has
shown me here that I should grant your motion
for summary judgment and should determine
that contract means, and I will here5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"1\tiR. ROE: Well, I'm not-I don,t want to
put on evidence where there are fact issues. You
can interrogate counsel and find out what they
are I think, Judge, and I can tell you what those
issues are (R. 98, 99).

*

*

*

*

"MR. ROE: Well, the partners can loan
money to the partnership, and the partnership
act recognizes this. That has a~ways been an issue
as to what the character of those things are, and
there just isn't anything in the record at all
before you now as to what those were except they
say he's put One Hundred Sixty-two Thousand
Five Hundred into it. We say he lent the money
to the partnership.
"MR. SCHOENHALS: Then you shouldn't
have moved for summary judgment.
"MR. ROE: Oh, I can move for summary
judgment on that because under my construction of the instrument they don't get anything
anyway but that doesn,t take away from this case
fact issues that are there (R. 100) ." [Emphasis
added.)
Rulon's counsel consistently objected to the course
of the proceedings, insisted that it was not a proceeding
at which evidence should be taken, and asserted throughout that if there were issues af fact to be tried that the
matter should be set for trial. Although there is nothing
in the record, anywhere, to show that counsel consented
to the trial judge trying the case as a factual matter,
respondents have treated the case as if it were one that
had been tried.

6
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The hearing was on a motion for summary judgment and the only factual issue before the judge was
whether there were disputed issues of material fact.

ARGUMENT
I
The rule that an appellate court will not reverse
where there is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial
court's position has no application to a summary judgment.
In his argument under Point I the respondent doesn't
cite a single case and makes statements about the law
and the effects of evidence which are contrary to the
most rudimentary principles. For instance, it is stated
that the fact that Rulon "agreed" to file a gift
tax return constituted an "admission" and showed his
intention "conclusively," but the statement disproves
itself because the agreement shows that there was no
gift. Moreover, an extra-judicial admission is evidential only, not conclusive, and even if the "supplemental
agreement" was admissible as evidence of Rulon's intention, the trier of fact would have to ~etermine the
weight to be given to it on the question of "completed
gift."
This court has held again and again that if there
is dispute as to any material fact a summary judgment
is not proper. If there had been a trial on the issues and
if the trial court had then come to certain conclusions
7
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with respect to the meaning of certain conduct of
the parties, respondents might have been correct in
contendingthat the findings, conclusions-and judgment
should be upheld if they were supported by sufficient
evidence. But there was no trial despite the trial court's
attempt to compel the parties to go to trial eo instanti
on questions raised in the argument. The appellant,
as he had a right to do under procedural rules, refused
a trial at that point, relying upon Rule 56 (c), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to the effect that judgment
will be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact" and a party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

II
Filing a motion for summary judgment does not
deprive the moving party of a right to trial of fact issues.
The respondents argue under Point II that the
appellant "represented" to the court that there was no
genuine issue of factl and that this, coupled with the
circumstance that he had made no denial of an affidavit
filed in behalf of Terry West, required the lower court
to accept "all evidence" as true and resolve the issues
in accordance therewith.
It is obvious that the court couldn't accept all of
the evidence as being true because the evidence was
1. Appellant also "represented" to the court that he was en·
titled to judgment as a matter of law, but this representation
apparently wasn't binding on anyone.

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conflicting, and the conflict had to be resolved by a
trial. The trial court could not, in a summary judgment
hearing, choose which evidence was to be believed. Although both parties move for a summary judgment
there is no implied consent that the court proceed to
try factual issues. See 6 Moore~s Federal Practice~
par. 56.13.
"The function of a motion for summary judgment is analago~~ to that of a motion for directed verdict. Although all parties move for
directed verdicts that does not warrant the court
in withdrawing the case from the jury if there
is any genuine disputed issue of fact.
"A parallel principle is applicable to the
summary judgment procedure. The well-settled
rule is that cross-motions for summary judgment
do not warrant the court in granting summary
judgment unless one of the moving parties is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon
facts that are not genuinely disputed.
" ( 1) A party, to be entitled to summary
judgment, has the burden of showing that the
facts, which would warrant judgment in his
favor under applicable substantive law principles
are indisputable. It does not follow from a
party~s failure to meet that burden~ that his adversary has satisfied a similar burden as to the
facts which would entitle the adversary to summary judgment. * * *

"(2) There may be no dispute as to the facts
which would justify judgment for one party on
a particular legal theory, although there may
be a dispute as to the facts which would justify
judgment for the adverse party. * * *

9
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"Where, then, it is clear that there is no dispute as to the facts which would justify judg·
ment for one of the parties, the court may properly sustain his motion, including an oral motion
made at the hearing; and, even in the absence of
a formal motion, may grant summary judgment
to a party when it is clear what the facts are
and his adversary has had a fair opportunity
to dispute them. On the other hand, if it is not
clearly established that there is. no dispute as to
the facts which would justify judgment for
one of the parties, then the court may not properly grant him judg·ment even though each side
has moved for summary judgment in its favor.
And this rule applies whether the case is a 'jury'
action or a 'court' action." [Emphasis added.)
The following statement from Begnaud v. White
( 6 Cir., 1948) 170 F.2d 323, supports and is quoted by
. Professor Moore:
"The fact that both parties makes motions for
summary judgment, and each contends in sup·
port of his respective motion that no genuine
issue of fact exists, does not require the court
to rule that no fact issue exists. * * * Appellant's
concession that no genuine issue of fact existed
was made in support of its own motion. for sum·
mary judgment. We do not think that the concession continues over into the court's separate
consideration of appellee's motion for summary
judgment in his behalf after appellant's motion
was overruled.''
See, also, F.A.R. Liquidating Corporation v.
Brownell (3 Cir., 1954) 209 F.2d 375, another case in
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which both parties had moved for summary judgment.
The court said:
"F.A.R. also. contends that since defendant
cross-moved for summary judgment, it is now
precluded from questioning the propriety of
disposing of -the case upon such a motion. But,
it is well established that cross-motions for summary judgmep.t do not warrant the trial court
granting summary judgment unless one of the
moving parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon facts that are not genuinely
disputed."

Hycon Manufacturing Company v. H. l(och &
Sons (9 Cir., 1955), 219 ~..,.2d 353, was an action for
infringement of letters patent. Upon cross-motions for
summary judgment the court had before it documentary
evidence relating to patent infringement; it granted
summary judgment for plaintiff, made findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and entered judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals said:
"The trial court exceeded the permissible limits of determination of disputed questions without trial. A motion for summary judgment cannot be granted simply because both sides move
for .it. An indispensible pre-requisite to such a
judgment is the absence of a material question
of fact. But it is obvious that there were postulates of fact involved in the diametrically opposite positions of the respective litigants. Both
contentions of fact could not be true.
"It is then said the proof was documentary
and was all before the trial court. If this were
conceded, there were still questions of fact to

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be resolved which an appellate court is not permitted to adjudicate. * * * The existence of the
basis of fact in documentary form or in agreed
statement of the parties does not transmute such
propositions into questions of law."
We have been unable to find any case in which
counsel has been estopped from claiming certain facts
to be in dispute because of a prior statement in a motion
for summary judgment that there were no genuine
issues as to material facts.z

III

The issues raised by appellant in this case were
raised before the trial court.
In point III of their brief, respondents seem to
say that the only defense raised by Rulon was lack of
consideration, and that it is now too late to raise any
other question as to the propriety of the trial court's
ruling. If that is what they are saying, they are again
engaged in writing fiction.
The transcript of the summary judgment hearing
records appellant's contentions that the "Supplemental
Agreement" was not effective as a deed of gift because
it could not be construed as relating to anything except
"contributions" and did not describe what was sup·
posed to have been given (R. 98, 99) ; that it purported
2. The statement is merely formal, in any event. The motion
for summary judgment incorporated language from Rule 56 and
set forth the grounds upon which a summary judgment may be
granted.

12
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to be part of a supplemental agreement for consideration (R. 96); that agreed consideration was never delivered (R. 102); and that Rulon was induced by the
undue influence of Terry's lawyer to sign the "supplemental agreement" at a time when the lawyer knew
plaintiff, under great pressure, was in a hurry to make
an important trip (R. 102). The contention was made
clear to the trial court that the "supplemental agreement" was not good as a contract because there is no
consideration, and not good as a gift because there
was no adequate description of the property being
given. Moreover, there was no donative intention since
the instrument shows on its face, and the affidavit and
answer of Terry show on their faces, that the document was one part of a larger transaction entered into
with respect to dissolution of the partnership. The
defenses (except undue influence) were also raised by
Rulon's reply to Terry's counterclaim (R. 32, 33).
Questions as to construction of the articles of partnership were raised by the complaint.

IV
Terry~s

affidavit cannot be accepted as proof of
disputed facts.
Respondents place a greater reliance on Terry's
affidavit than is warranted by the affidavit itself, the
law relating to affidavits, or Terry's lack of credibility
as demonstrated by his deposition. The summary judgment was entered by the trial court on the basis of
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depositions, interrogatories, and pleadings in the file
(R. 107), as well as the affidavit. Terry could not, by
filing an affidavit, escape from the testimony recorded
in his deposition, and establish as "admitted" factual
matters which had been expressly denied by Rulon in
his deposition. The affidavit's only purpose was to show
the existence or non-existence of a dispute as to material
facts. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the third
circuit in F.A.R. Liquidating Corp. v. Brownell~ 209
F.2d 379, cited supra:
"F.A.R. argues on appeal, however, that there
is not the slightest doubt that Fernseh's June
14th cable was dispatched prior to 1:10 p.m.
As 'clearly proving' this contention F.A.R. relies heavily on a detailed affidavit from an expert
from R.C.A. Communications, Inc., wherein the
opinion is rendered that the cable was transmitted before 1 :10 p.m. on June 14. But, although an affidavit filed in support of a motion
for summary judgment may be considered for
the purpose of ascertaining whether an issue of
fact is presented, it cannot be used as a basis
for deciding the fact issue. Frederick Hart & Co.
v. Recordgraph Corp.~ 3rd Cir., 1948, 169 F.2d
580. In addition, it is obvious from a reading
of the affidavit that it is nothing more than an
opinion. Summary judgment on such evidence
is improper."
The above statement of the rule is consonant with
the language of the rule itself respecting the requirements for affidavits. Rule 56 (e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides:
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"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. * * * "
Terry's affidavit is filled with conclusions, opinions,
and hearsay declarations, and there is no showing (affirmative or otherwise) that Terry was competent. For
example, he states that his agreement to sign the dissolution was "conditioned" upon Rulon signing the
agreement identified as Exhibit No. 1; that plaintiff
"understood and agreed" that Exhibit 1 constituted
a transfer; that plaintiff "verified" the fact to another
member of the family; that plaintiff "indicated" that
he would receive back only 40%; that it was the "intention" of plaintiff and defendant and that both parties
"understood and agreed" that the distribution would
be in a certain way; that it was "the intention of the
parties" that, should the partnership be terminated,
distribution would be as contended by the respondent
-and so on. The statements contained in the affidavit
would be completely inadequate to support a summary
judgment even if most of them were not controverted
by other statements of fact contained in the depositions
of Terry R. West, Flora E. West and Rulon R. West
-which they in fact are.

15
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CONCLUSION
The respondents were not entitled to summary
judgment. There is evidence that the original partnership agreement was prepared by Terry R. West, a fact
which would be considered by the trier of fact in resolving any ambiguities in the agreement. The contemporaneous construction by the parties themselves is also
an important fact. A fact-trier would have to consider
the fact that capital accounts were carried for Rulon
R. West and Flora E. West and Terry R. West in
the accounting system set UP. by Terry; that amounts
paid into, or lent, to the partnership by Rulon were
credited to him, and were not transferred by Terry to
himself and Flora until there was a falling out. More·
over, all amounts lent to the partnership by Flora were
paid back by Terry, with interest at 8<fo. (R. 53).
With respect to the dissolution agreement, there
are questions of fact as to the signing of the agreement
by Flora, whether the agreement ever became effective,
and the negotiations bearing upon construction of the
term "liabilities to partners" in the portions of the
agreement requiring repayment of such liabilities prior
to distribution of the "net assets."
With respect to the so-called supplemental agree·
ment there are questions of fact relating to the intention
of the parties in signing it; whether part of the agree·
ment was for Terry to buy Rulon's interest within a
specified time after signing of the supplemental agree·
ment; whether it was intended to be part of the disso·
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lution agreement; whether it was ever acquiesced in
by Flora prior to the time it was repudiated by Rulon;
whether Terry's attorney exerted undue influence on
Rulon in getting him to sign the agreement in the first
place.
In the trial court Rulon contended that the partnership agreement was clear enough, particularly in
light of the contemporaneous construction by the
parties, that the court would have to conclude that the
40-40-20 distribution would be of the assets of the
partnership remaining after "winding up" of the partnership and the payment of all partnership liabilities,
including liabilities to partners.
The so-called supplemental agreement signed by
Rulon and Terry (but not by Flora) is consistent with
this construction. Whether Terry and Flora receive
all contributions of Rulon, or only the initial contributions, or whether they only receive a share of profits,
it could be treated by the parties as a ''gift'' under the
terms of the supplemental agreement. But that agreement never did define what was being "given." It
referred to the "contributions"-whatever they were.
The court through some kind of wizardry was able
to find in that agreement a gift to Terry West and
Flora West all of the moneys that had ever been put
into the partnership, by way of contribution, loan, ad. vancement, or what have you, from the beginning of
the partnership to the date of the agreement by Rulon
-all without any trial with respect to the circumstances
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under which the agreement was signed and the intention
of the parties in signing it.
We submit that the case should be reversed and
the court directed to enter judgment that distribution
of the partnership assets on a 40-40-20 basis should
not be made until repayment of all liabilities to the
partners, particularly contributions to capital and loans
to the partnership, as well as interest earned by the
capital contributions and loans. If the court feels that
the agreement is not clear enough in this respect, the
case should nevertheless be sent back to the trial court
for a trial of issues relating to construction of the
agreement and the dissolution agreement, and the circumsta~ces under which the so-called supplemental
agreement was signed by two of the three partners.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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